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This article reviews significant legal developments that affected the Middle East and
North Africa in 2011.1 The year was the most unexpected and transformative year the
Middle East has faced in the last 100 years. Protests planned using cell phones and social
media summoned hundreds of thousands of people in many Arab countries, including
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Bahrain, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Syria to take to the
streets and demand reforms. In some countries, such as Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and
Bahrain, savvy rulers heeded the protestors' demands and proposed reforms. In other
countries, dated dictators either fought until the end or fled their capitol. This series of
protests, which many believe were inspired by protests in Tunisia that ousted President
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011, became known as the Arab Spring.
Where rulers subject to Arab Spring protests offered to make reforms, protests have
ceased, with analysts noting that the promised reforms have not had the intended effect,
such as in Morocco. Where dictators were overthrown, the people now struggle to par-
ticipate in the formation of a new government, with recurring protests by citizens nervous
about new but oppressive political forces usurping the people's will, such as in Egypt.
In the few Middle Eastern countries that did not participate in the Arab Spring, other
key legal reforms took place. Attempts to broaden free speech rights were made in some
countries. For example, the Iraqi government passed a law aimed at protecting journalists,
and the Pakistani high court sentenced a man to death for killing someone who opposed
an anti-blasphemy law. Contrarily, Turkey reaffirmed its limits on free speech, by contin-
uing to limit access to many popular websites, including YouTube.
Some Middle Eastern countries made advances in the area of labor law. The National
Labor Court of Israel handed down a detailed decision regarding employees' expectations
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of privacy in the work place with regard to their emails, and spelled out limitations on
employers' rights to monitor such emails. Saudi Arabia adopted a "Saudization" policy
that targets and requires Saudi companies to hire more Saudi nationals. This law is driven
by the fact that Saudi companies employ 6.5 million expatriates and only 700,000 Saudi
nationals.
The effects of the Arab Spring will be felt for years, but the rise of undeniable protes-
tors' demands has had two diverging effects: some long-standing dictators have been
forced out or are on their way out, and other tyrants have acquiesced and promised certain
reforms. For the countries seeking new leadership, the road will be bumpy and fraught
with those who race to take power without considering the needs of the people. And for
those countries with budding reforms, the dissatisfied protestors may be ready to march
again if they do not see enough change.
I. Egypt*.
The Arab Spring, arguably, is most poignandy defined by Egypt's "January 25 Revolu-
tion," which was set into motion within days of Tunisia's own dramatic government take-
over. Egypt's revolution ended following just eighteen days of protests when President
Hosni Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011, after the Egyptian military renounced its
support for him.2
Although the Egyptian military was seen as having a close bond with the Egyptian peo-
ple, 3 many in Egypt fear that the military is slowing progress toward a democratic society.
After the revolution, the Egyptian military suspended Egypt's oppressive constitution and
dissolved the parliament.4 The military then oversaw sweeping constitutional reforms
that were approved overwhelmingly by referendum.5 In March 2011, the military prom-
ised to cede legislative and executive powers once parliamentary and presidential elections
planned for September were completed.6 But those elections never happened, and the
military continues to control Egypt.7
The military has stated that it will maintain control until parliamentary elections are
completed, a new constitution is ratified, a constitutional assembly is appointed, and a new
president is elected.8 All of this could take two years or longer. 9 In the meantime, bloody
* Kinan H. Romman of Ahmad, Zavitsanos & Anaipakos in Houston, prepared the report on Egypt.
2. David Kirkpatrick, Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2011, at Al,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/0 2/12/world/middleeast/l 2egypt.html?pagewanted=all.
3. During the revolution, protestors often chanted, "The Army and the people are one hand!" See Tony
Karon, Will Egypt's Military Hijack its Revolution?, TIME WORLD - GLOBAL SPIN (July 19, 2011), http://
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4. Raja Abdulrahim, Ned Parker & Jeffrey Fleishman, Egypt military dissolves parliament, suspends constitu-
tion, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/201 1/feb/14/world/la-fg-egypt-aftermath-2011
0214.
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riots have taken place in June and October over perceived corruption among military
elites and sectarian friction. 10
Egyptians fear that the military may continue the old policies of Mubarak. On Septem-
ber 12, following a looting of the Israeli embassy in Cairo, Egypt's military government
resurrected the old regime's feared and reviled "emergency law" to crush protests using
detentions without trial." The emergency law was activated in 1981 by Mubarak 12 and
maintained continuously under his regime. The military also engaged in violence toward
Coptic Christians and has used state-run media to cover up its attacks. 13 Egyptians hope
the military will allow the people to realize the democratic society for which they fought.
This can only happen if the country's new constitution is ratified, fair elections held, and




In January of 2011, the government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi attempted to ad-
dress Ethiopia's artificial commodity shortage by issuing warnings to the local business
community and threatening to allow "foreign wholesale giants" to enter the Ethiopian
marketplace.15 Due to commercial inactivity, the government plans to institute an item-
ized licensing system to restructure the wholesale markets.' 6
B. ENVlRONMENT
The United Nations has weighed in on the planning of the Gibe I hydroelectric dam
because its construction on the Omo River will ultimately kill the downstream Lake
Turkana. 17 First, the U.N. Committee on Racial Discrimination has given the govern-
ment of Ethiopia until January 2012 to provide credible evidence that the indigenous
peoples in the region have been consulted' 8 and independent socioeconomic impact as-
9. Id.
10. Maggie Michael, Group Warns Of Cover-Up in Egypt Christian Deaths, ASSOCIATED PREss (Oct. 25,
2011), http://news.yahoo.com/group-warns-cover-egypt-christian-deaths-122552642.html.
11. David D. Kirkpatrick, AfterAttack on Embassy, Egypt Vows a Tougher Stance on Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
10, 2011), at A10, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/world/middleeast/1 legypt.html?pagewanted=all.
12. See Law No. 162 of 1958 (Emergency Law) Official Gazette of 28 September 1958, No. 28, Bis. (dis-
solved). Although the law was enacted in 1958, it had only been used during the 1967 War before Mubarak
came into power.
13. Michael, supra note 10.
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15. Haset Sees Opportunity in Meles' Wholesale Trade Warning, CAPITAL ETHIOPIA (Nov. 1, 2011), available at
http://www.dailyethiopia.com/index.php?aid=1026.
16. Id.
17. U.N. Economic and Social Council, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 9th Sess., HR/5020 (Apr.
28, 2010), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/20l0/hr5020.doc.htm.
18. UN Demands Urgent Answers from Ethiopia Over Gibe III Dam, SURVVAL INT'L (Oct. 13, 2011), http://
www.survivalinternational.org/news/7783.
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sessments have been carried out.19 Additionally, the U.N.'s World Heritage Committee,
stressing the importance of Lake Turkana as a research area, called on the government of
Ethiopia to suspend all work on the dam until all of the environmental impacts have been
assessed. 20
Drought struck the horn of Africa severely this year,21 resulting in a widespread famine
that has affected more than thirteen million people, including 4.5 million Ethiopians.22
Prime Minister Zenawi has outlined plans for resettlement and new irrigation systems to
alleviate the drought's effects on Ethiopians. 23
C. TERRORISM
Using the rubric of the 2009 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, 24 the Ethiopian government
this year detained a number of critics and opposition politicians. 25 Those arrested and
charged with terrorism include actors, journalists,2 6 and opposition party leaders, who
were allegedly involved with Ginbot 7, a banned dissent group.2 7 These charges were
brought by the federal high court after WikiLeaks released a number of documents and
reports tying the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service to bombings in
Addis Ababa, which were promptly blamed on opposition groups and Eritrean terrorist
groups.28 Human Rights Watch summed up the situation by stating, "it is very dangerous
to criticize the government in Ethiopia" right now, 29 and has called upon Prime Minister
Zenawi's government to stop using the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation to restrict Ethiopi-
ans' freedom of speech.30
19. Joanna Eede, UN Puts Pressure on Ethiopia Over Controversial Gibe 111 Dam, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC: NEW-
SWATCH (Oct. 12, 2011), http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2011/10/12/un-puts-pressure-on-ethio-
pia-over-controversial-gibe-iii-dam/.
20. Argaw Ashine, UN Ca/lsfor Suspension of Gibe III Dam, ADDIS VOICE (uly 28, 2011, 3:07 AM), http://
addisvoice.com/2011/07/un-calls-for-suspension-of-gibe-iii-dam-dn/.
21. Nathanial Gronewold, Africa Drought Endangers Millions, N.Y. TIMES (uly 5, 2011), http://www.ny-
times.com/cwire/2011/07/05/05clmatewire-africa-drought-endangers-millions-22493.html?pagewanted=all.
22. Katharine Houreld, Aid Groups: Famine Response Too Slow, USA TODAY, Jan. 19, 2012, http://www.
usatoday.comfUSCP/PN1/NEWS/2012-01-19-BCAFEast-AfricaFanine6th-LdWritethruST_U.htm.
23. Andrew Meldrum, Is Resettlement the Best Response to Drought and Famine?, GLOBAL POST (Aug. 1, 2011,
5:57 PM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/africa-emerges/ethiopia-responds-fam-
ine-land-resettlement.
24. Proclamation on Anti-Terrorism, Proclamation No. 652/2009, Negarit Gazetta, 15th Year, No. 57,
available at http://www.cthiopian-law.com/federal-laws/procedural-law/rriminal-procedure-law/special-pro-
cedures/318-anti-terrorism-proclamation-no-6522009.html.
25. Ethiopia: Crackdown on Dissent Intensifies, HUM. RTs. WATCH (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/
news/2011/09/16/ethiopia-crackdown-dissent-intensifies.
26. Ethiopia Charges Six Journalists with Terrorism, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Nov. 11,2011, 5:07
PM), http://cpj.org/2011/11/ethiopia-charges-six-journalists-with-terrorism.php.
27. Id.
28. Thomas C. Mountain, WikiLeaks Ethiopia Files: Ethiopia Bombs Itself, Blames Eritrea, FOREIGN POLICY
J., Sept. 16, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/09/16/wikileaks-ethiopia-files-ethiopia-bombs-
itself-blames-eritrea/.
29. Ethiopia: Crackdown on Dissent Intensifies, supra note 25.
30. Ethiopia: Terrorism Law Undercuts Free Speech, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (July 25, 2011), http://www.hrw.
org/news/2011/07/25/ethiopia-terrorism-law-undercuts-free-speech; see also Alemayehu G. Mariam, Ethiopia:
Dictatorship is State Terrorism, SALON.COM (Oct. 3, 2011, 12:26 AM), http://open.salon.com/blog/almariam/
201 1/10/01/dictatorship_is state-terrorism.
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D. WOMEN
In January of 2011, two districts in the Afar region formally outlawed female circumci-
sion, due to health problems it causes for many women who have been subjected to the
practice.3 1 While female genital mutilation and cutting (FGM/C) is illegal in Ethiopian
criminal law, it was only with this formal denunciation of the practice that the regional
state of Afar adopted the law.32
Violence against women in Ethiopia is on the rise,33 partially due to the implementation
of the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation, which has posed serious challenges to
local women's advocacy groups. The Network of Ethiopian Women's Associations held
an emergency meeting after the brutal crime committed against Aberash Hailay by her ex-
husband in September, 34 but is still restricted by the Proclamation and the Agency that
oversees its implementation. 35 Indeed, 2011 saw the Charities and Societies Agency
freeze the funds of the highly regarded Ethiopian Women's Lawyers Association. 36
III. Iran*
A. ELIMINATING THE PRESIDENCY?
In mid-October, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei announced that, if the interests of the
state required it, a prime minister elected by the parliament could replace the Iranian
presidency, a post filled every four years via popular election.37 Ten days after the radical
pronouncement, Ali Larijani, speaker of the Iranian parliament, simultaneously endorsed
and softened the proclamation by stating that the change would not be so much a replace-
ment of the president but simply a change in the method of electing the head of state.38
It is not clear when the change would take place, if at all, but a debate is underway and
key figures and institutions are taking sides. Former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Raf-
sanjani opposes the election of the head of state by any means other than a popular elec-
tion, while a key spokesperson for the Guardian Council has declared the change would
not undermine the republican character of the Islamic Republic. 39 There is speculation
31. Ethiopia: Pastoralists Battling FGM/C, IRIN (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?Re-
portId-91732.
32. Id.
33. Billene Seyoum, Ethiopia: Violence Against Women On the Rise, ALL AFRICA (Sept. 22, 2011), http://
allafrica.com/stories/201109230898.html.
34. Id.
35. Phillip Barea, Ethiopian Charities and Societies Agency Shuts Down Organisations, EZEGA.COM (Feb. 18,
2011), http://www.ezega.comlNews/NewsDetails.aspx?Page=Heads&NewsID=2 776.
36. Mahlet Mesfin, Ethiopia: Board Upholds Revocation of NGOs, Licenses, Accounts Freeze, ALL AFnucA (Feb.
7, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201102081019.html.
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among members of the parliament that the shift in rules may be imminent, such that the
currently scheduled 2013 presidential election may not take place. 40
Some analysts surmise that Khamenei's proposal arises from recent tensions between
parliament and President Ahmadinejad, 41 as the parliament has been severely restrained
under Ahmadinejad's presidency. 42 For example, Mr. Ahmadinejad's administration has
delayed submission of the budget to the parliament, thereby forcing parliament to accept
the administration's budget without proper review and revision to meet the approval
deadline. Further, while the parliament approved the sum of $20 billion to spend on
subsidies as part of the new subsidy reform plan (discussed below), the administration
appropriated $40 billion. 43
Other analysts argue that roadblocks with just one president do not justify such a funda-
mental change, and attribute Ayatollah Khamenei's proposal to an ongoing rivalry with
the office of the president in general. 44 While the Supreme Leader still has final authority
on all law and policy, the presidency has evolved into a rival center of power, with each
president contributing to key policy and effecting the country's direction. 45 In particular,
the appeal of former president Khatami's reformist agenda of rule of law, political plural-
ism, and freedom of press still pose a threat to the Supreme Leader.46
Eliminating the post of the president would require many steps. Procedurally, the
Council for the Revision of the Constitution would need to convene and draft a constitu-
tional amendment.47 Perhaps more significantly, the Supreme Leader would need to be
prepared to justify what will likely appear as an attack on popular sovereignty and popular
will to the public.48 The Supreme Leader appears to have the power to effect the change,
but it is too early to know whether he will follow through with the threat.
B. SUBSIDY REFORM
Over the years, highly subsidized energy in Iran has made Iran one of the most energy-
intensive economies in the world.49 Iran's high domestic consumption has both depleted
the reserve of energy products for export as well as starved funds needed for investment in
developing the energy market.50 To combat the rise in energy use and waste, the govern-
ment decided to rationalize consumption by raising energy prices and simultaneously dis-
tributing energy dividends to the population to help offset a sudden rise in energy
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Challenging the Balance of Power: Ahamadinead vs. Parliament, an Interview with Hosein Ghazian, IRAN
PRIMER- UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE (Oct. 4, 2011, 11:58 PM), http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/
201 1/oct/05/challenging-balance-power-ahmadinejad-vs-parlianent.
43. Id.





49. DOMINIQUE GUILLAME, ROMAN ZYTEK, AND MOHOMmAD REZA FARZIN, INT'L MONETARY FUND,
IRAN - THE CHRONICLES OF THE SUBSIDY REFORM 5-6 (July 2011), http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/
wp/201 /wp 1167.pdf.
50. Id. at 6.
VOL. 46, NO. 1
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA 607
expenses. 51 This plan is laid out in the Targeted Subsidy Reform Act (Reform Act). The
Reform Act was approved by the parliament in January 2010, and the administration un-
dertook a public relations campaign to sell the reforms to the public. The plan was imple-
mented in December 2010.
By most accounts, the administration's implementation of the subsidy reform has been a
success, though its long-term effects cannot yet be determined. Protests did not ensue
following the December 2010 implementation, and prices were upwardly adjusted as re-
quired by the law. Dividends were also distributed to Iranians to help them offset their
increased expenses. It is estimated that by December 2011, Iranian households will have
received at least $30 billion in freely usable cash. Further, as part of the long-term strat-
egy of the subsidy reform, $10-s15 billion will have been advanced to finance projects
aimed at reducing energy intensity.5 2
What is so far seen as the successful implementation of the price increases has created
an opportunity for Iran to reform and develop the growth of its economy.5 3 The corpo-
rate sector will play a significant role in this process, as it will have to adopt more energy
efficient technologies and produce energy efficient products. 54 The government's in-
volvement is crucial as only it can ease the pass through of higher energy prices to compa-
nies by reducing import/export tariffs and controlling inflation and exchange rate
policies.55 The hope is that cooperation between the corporate sector and the govern-
ment sector will result in Iranian consumers purchasing more energy efficient products,
thereby driving energy costs down on a permanent basis.56
TV. fraq*
A. MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS
The failure of the prime minister to form a government for much of 2010 caused delays
in the passing of key legislation into 2011.57 Iraq passed its first budget on February 20,
2011.58 The $82.6 billion cuts the salaries of the prime minister and members of parlia-
ment, forecasts a deficit of $13.4 billion, and allocates large amounts to Iraq's social
services. 59
The Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) law that provides for the establishment
and regulation of NGOs operating in Iraq was implemented. 60 The law provides tax ex-
51. Id.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. at 21,
54. Id.
55. Id. at 21-22.
56. Id. at 22.
* Jason Tauches submitted the article on Iraq.
57. See Iraq Elections, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 21, 2010), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/intemational/
countriesandterritories/iraq/elections/index.html.
58. U.S. DFP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, IRAQ POLICY & OPERATIONS GROUP,
IRAQ STATUS REPORT, 1 (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/157897.pdf.
59. Id. at 1-2.
60. NGO Law Monitor: Iraq, INT'L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PRoFrr LAw, http://www.icnl.org/research/moni-
tor/iraq.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
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emption for public utility companies only, and provides for limited personal liability for
NGO members.61
The government accepted the need for U.S. military trainers in Iraq, but refused to
grant them legal immunity if they remained in the country beyond 2011, prompting the
U.S. to withdraw its forces by the end of the year.62 U.S. troops finished their withdrawal
from Iraq on December 18, 2011.63
B. FREE SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY
The government passed what is known as the Draft Informatics Law to protect Iraqi
journalists. 64 Critics, however, argued that its vague language did not protect Iraqi jour-
nalists.65 The Draft Informatics Law was criticized for endangering freedom of speech
and assembly. 66 Article 3, most notably, gives law enforcement broad powers to censor
any computer use that it deems compromises the unity of the state.67
C. PROTECTION OF WOMEN
Legislators in the Iraqi government declined to introduce legislation to protect women
from domestic violence. 68 According to the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969, criminal actions are
excused in the exercise of certain rights. 69 Men have the right to punish their wives ac-
cording to the limits provided by law and custom. 70
D. HYDROCARBON LAW
Iraq has yet to pass a hydrocarbon law, which would provide for the regulation of in-
vestment, production, and revenue distribution of Iraq's oil and gas industry.71 The final
draft, sent to the Parliament by the cabinet, increases tensions between the central gov-
ernment and the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan by providing that the central govern-
61. See The Law of Non-Gov't Orgs. No. 12 of 2010 (Iraq), translated and reprinted by Int'l Center for
Non-Profit Law, http://www.ncciraq.org/images/stories/NCCI%20DB/NGOs/NGOlaw/Republicoflraq
LawonNonGovernmentalOrganizationsof201OFinalTextENG.pdf.
62. Tim Arango & Michael S. Schmidt, Iraq Denies Legal Immunity to U.S. Troops After 2011, N.Y. TwIEs,
Oct. 4, 2011, at A4, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/world/middleeastliraqis-say-no-to-immrunity-for-
remaining-american-troops.html.
63. Tim Arango & Michael S. Schmidt, Last Convoy of American Troops Leaves Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
2011, at A6, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/world/middleeast/last-convoy-of-american-troops-leaves-
iraq.html?pagewanted=alil.
64. New Law Fails to Protect Journalists, Creates New Problems, REPORTERS WITHouT BORDERS (Sept. 6,
2011), http://en.rsf.org/iraq-new-law-fails-to-protect-06-09-2011,40930.html.
65. Id.
66. Iraq: Draft Informatics Crimes Law, ARTiCLE19.ORG (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.articlel9.org/re-
sources.php/resource/2792/en/iraq:-draft-informatics-crimes-law.
67. Id.




71. RPT-FACTBOX-Comparison of Iraq Oil Law Drafts, New and Old, REUTERS AFRicA (Sept. 23,2011,2:08
PM), http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL5E7KM3T420110923.
VOL. 46, NO. 1
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA 609
ment will manage and regulate national resources, with all decisions made by an oil and
gas council. 72
E. Au-rONOMous REGION OF KURDISTAN
The Autonomous Region of Kurdistan passed its own NGO Law providing for the
establishment and regulation of civil society within its borders. 73
Kurdistan took a positive forward step towards protecting women by outlawing female
genital mutilation. 74
V. Israel*
The scope of employee privacy rights with respect to usage of employer provided infor-
mation technology systems-particularly regarding email communications and the em-
ployer's corresponding ability to monitor employee usage of the same-had been
somewhat unclear in Israel. The National Labor Court handed down a decision providing
an in-depth analysis of employee privacy rights in this context, with a focused discussion
on the scope of and limitations on employers' rights to monitor employee emails. 75
The case establishes the importance of applying an explicit policy to any conduct in-
volving email monitoring, disclosing the policy to employees, obtaining a general consent
to the policy, and exercising reasonable and proportionate discretion on a case-by-case
basis in connection with any email monitoring, including, in certain cases, obtaining the
individual employee's express consent with respect to monitoring of particular emails. In
addition to establishing the terms of any monitoring, the policy may prohibit employees
from visiting certain websites, limit the length of time employees can browse the web, and
prohibit the introduction of "foreign" hardware into its computer network.
The monitoring policy must meet several conditions: monitoring must be reasonable;
monitoring must be limited to business purposes sufficiently important to justify the in-
trusion into employee privacy; the means of monitoring should be the least harmful possi-
ble to employees' privacy; monitored data may only be retained if it relates to the purposes
of a legitimate monitoring program, while extraneous information collected "incidentally"
in the course of monitoring must be disregarded.
The decision distinguishes between work-only email inboxes, personal inboxes, and
"mixed" inboxes. With respect to a work-only email inbox, monitoring is permitted sub-
ject to the terms of a legitimate policy as described above. With respect to a personal
inbox, personal correspondence in a mixed inbox, or personal correspondence contained
(even in violation of employer policy) in a "work-only" inbox, the employee's specific
72. Id.
73. NGO Law Monitor: Iraq, supra note 60.
74. Iraqi Kurdistan: Law Banning FGM a Positive Step, HuM. RTs. WTCH (July 26, 2011), http://www.
hrw.org/news/2011/07/2 5/iraqi-kurdistan-law-banning-fgm-positive-step.
* Orly Gerbi is a partner at Herzog, Fox & Neeman in Tel Aviv, Israel, and the head of the Labour and
Employment Practice Group, where Gabriel Posner is an intern. Eric A. Savage is a shareholder in the New
York office of Littler Mendelson, P.C., a national management-side labour and employment firm.
75. LA 90/08, Isaakov Inbar v. Women's Law Superior [2011] (Isr.); see also Israeli Market Developments,
UNFOLDING (Herzog, Fox & Neeman, Tel-Aviv, Israel), available at http://israel.ahk.de/fileadmin/ahkisraell
DokumentefHerzog Fox_NeemanNewsetter/HFN_-_Newsletter 2.pdf
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consent is required prior to monitoring each private correspondence, such that a "double
consent" is required, involving the employee's consent to the general monitoring policy
and specifically the monitoring of the particular emails involved. With respect to moni-
toring an external private email account (e.g., Gmail), even employee consent will be
deemed presumptively void and unenforceable. A court order may be sought to enable
such monitoring.
Separately, two additional employment law developments are noteworthy. First, ex-
tending a clear trend towards further expanding employee pension and severance benefit
schemes, a regulatory order established new contribution rates for pension and severance
benefit programs, with cumulative contributions (including both employer and employee
components) totaling 17.5% of salary, effective in 2014.76 Second, on March 22, 2011,
the Israeli legislature passed Amendment No. 4 of the Sick Pay Law, 5736-1976, increas-
ing sick leave pay to fifty percent (up from 37.5%) of salary for the second and third days
of absence and full salary (up from 75%) through the remainder of the sick leave period. 77
VT. Jordan*
Historic events in the region affected this year's legal developments in Jordan. In par-
ticular, constitutional amendments were announced and legislative priorities were reas-
sessed. The Kingdom also passed new laws including the General Pardon Law.7 8
A. CONsTrruLroNAL AMENDMENTS
The Constitution was a prominent issue in the public discourse surrounding Jordan's
experience with the Arab Spring. King Abdullah II appointed a royal committee tasked
with deliberating and proposing amendments to the Constitution.79 The committee pro-
posed several amendments that parliament later approved, and, subsequently, the King
endorsed nearly forty amendments.80 The amendments range from creation of new state
institutions to addressing civil liberties.
Notably, the amendments create a new Constitutional Court with the authority to in-
validate laws and regulations that it deems unconstitutional.8' Another significant devel-
opment is the amendments' restrictions on the passage and use of temporary laws.8 2
Temporary laws have been frequently used for key pieces of legislation, such as the Cyber
76. Extension Order for Comprehensive Pension Insurance (Aug. 3, 2011) (Isr.).
77. Id.
* James Weir, a lawyer based in Amman, prepared the report on developments in Jordan with the
assistance of Asem AJ-Rawashdeh, an attorney with the firm of Odeh & Partners. James can be reached at
jdweir.law@gmail.com.
78. General Pardon Law of 2011 (Act No. 15) (Jordan), available at http://www.petra.gov.jo/Public-News/
NwsNewsDetails.aspx?lang=l &siteid=2&NewsID=34285&Type--P.
79. Letter from King Abdullah I of Jordan to Ahmad Lozi (Apr. 26, 2011), available at http://www.kin-
gabdullah.jo/index.php/enUS/royalLetterslview/id/285.html.
80. See CONSTITUTION OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, available at http://www.law.yale.edu/
rcw/rcw/jurisdictions/asw/jordan/jordan_const-eng.pdf.
81. See id. arts. 58-61 (the Constitutional Court, as yet to be formed, cannot review laws sua sponte, but
rather upon a motion from specific government bodies).
82. See id. art. 94.
VOL. 46, NO. 1
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA 611
Crimes law and the Renewable Energy law of 2010.83 Another key amendment estab-
lishes a body to oversee elections and places limits on the ability to dissolve parliament.
8 4
B. THE RENEWABLE ENERGY LAW
The Renewable Energy Law was issued last year as a temporary law and a priority
under the national strategy.85 It subsequently garnered much international interest. It
was meant to spur investment and address Jordan's precarious energy security. But this
legislation remained a temporary law subject to change and has not yet had the anticipated
impact.86 Key provisions regarding the financing and management of a fund called for in
the law may be reworked despite donor agreements.8 7
C. GENERAL PARDON LAW
In criminal law, a General Pardon Law granted pardons for a number of crimes and
violations.8 8 Affecting thousands of cases, the pardon applies to acts committed before
June 1, 2011. The law excludes a number of crimes from this amnesty ranging from
national security to fraud. 89 The pardon has no effect on civil liabilities arising out of the
underlying crime.90
VII. Libya*
Libya has undergone major transformations this past year because of the popular over-
throw of Colonel Muammar Gadhafi, Libya's head of state and effective dictator since
1969. This regime change has spawned serious judicial reconsiderations that focus upon
addressing human rights and humanitarian law violations perpetuated by the Gadhafi-led
government and developing legal and political standards to reflect Libya's hopeful future.
Most notable are the number of international legal precedents set by the Libyan revolu-
tion: the Libyan United Nations delegation became the first to renounce its own govern-
ment, instead vowing to solely represent its people;9' the U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1973 went further than any past Resolution in authorizing the participation of
83. See Information Systems Crime Law of 2010 (Temporary Law No. 30) (Jordan); see also Renewable
Energy & Energy Efficiency Law of 2010 (Temporary Law No. 3) (Jordan), available at http://www.memr.
gov.jo/Portals/O/Renewable% 2OEnergy%2OLaw% 20Translation.pdf.
84. See CONSTrUrION OF TIHE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, arts. 67, 73-74, available at http://
www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/jurisdictions/asw/jordan/jordaneonst_eng.pdf.
85. See Renewable Energy & Energy Efficiency Law of 2010 (Temporary Law No. 3) (Jordan).
86. See, e.g., id. art. 10.
87. See id. art. 11.
88. See General Pardon Law of 2011, supra note 78.
89. See id. art. 3.
90. See id. art. 4.
* Ben Apple, a 2014J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School, and Jenna DiCocco, a Boston-based attorney
and professor, prepared the report on legal developments in Libya.
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international actors in the regime change of a U.N. member; 92 the African Commission
on Human and Peoples' Rights referred Libya's case to the African Court based, for the
first time, on non-governmental organizations advocacy efforts;93 and the International
Criminal Court, in investigating the Gadhafi regime, issued indictments for crimes against
humanity in record time. 94
A. CmZEN ACTIVISM & LNTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
In mid-February 2011, amid popular uprisings throughout the Arab region, peaceful
Libyan civilians began calling for a national constitution and the establishment of rule of
law.95 Colonel Gadhafi quickly responded with unequivocal force, directing his military
to control demonstrations with live ammunition, restricting all Internet access to thwart
the people's attempts to organize, and arresting anti-Gadhafi lawyers and activists. 96 In
defiance, anti-Gadhafi militias formed throughout the country, founding local governing
councils, and pronouncing their loyalty to the Benghazi-based National Transitional
Council.97
In late February, the U.N. quickly responded to calls from within and without Libya for
international assistance.98 Like many Libyan officials and diplomats, Libya's U.N. delega-
tion went so far as to denounce Gadhafi and assert its role as its people's representative. 99
Citing "the deaths of hundreds of civilians," the U.N. Human Rights Council established
an independent International Commission of Inquiry to investigate the "recent gross and
systematic human rights violations in Libya" and recommended the suspension of Libya's
Council membership.100 The following day, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution
1970, demanding an immediate end to the violence and human rights violations, referring
the situation to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, setting up an arms
92. See Michael N. Schmitt, Wings Over Libya: The No-Fly Zone in Legal Perspective, 36 YALE J. INT'L L.
ONLINE 45, 57 (2011), http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-36-schmitt-wings-over-libya.pdf ("The no-fly zone
now being enforced in Libya is the most robust no-fly zone authorized by the Security Council to date."); see
also Mehrdad Payandeh, The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime Change in Libya, 52 VA. J. INT'L
L. 355, 355 (2012) ("A closer examination of Resolution 1973 shows the considerably broad scope of authori-
zation, which could-with certain restrictions-also be regarded as a legal basis for regime change in
Libya.").
93. The African Court on Human and People's Rights Seized of a Case against Libya, IN'rL FED'N FOR HUM.
RTs. (FIDE) (Apr. 15, 2011), http://fidh.org/IMG/article-PDF/article-a9527.pdf.
94. The Situation in Libya Referred to the ICC, FIDH (Feb. 28, 2011), http://fidh.org/IMG/articlePDF/
article a9221.pdf; Prosecutor v. Gaddafi & AI-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Application Pursuant to Article 58, 1 41 (Jun. 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1099314.pdf.
95. Libya-Towards a Bloody Revolution, FIDH (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.fidh.org/IMG/articlePDF/arti-
clea9174.pdf.
96. Libyan Leader Must End Spiralling Killings, AMNEsrY INT'L (Feb. 20, 2011), http://amnesty.org/en/
news-and-updates/libyan-leader-must-end-spiralling-killings-2011-02-20; Libya: Governments Should Demand
End to Unlawful Killings, HuM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/02/20/
libya-govemments-should-demand-end-unlawful-killings.
97. See Peter Beaumont, Thirty Miles From Tripoli - Frontline in the Libya Revolt, THE GuARDiAN (Feb. 28,
2011, 2:40 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/27/libya-30-miles-from-tripoli.
98. Human Rights Council Res. S-15/1, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 15th Sess., Feb. 25, 2011, A/
HRC/S-15/1, at 3 (supporting statements by the Arab League, the African Union, and the Secretary General
of the Organization of the Islamic Conference); Unanimous Security Council Vote, supra note 91.
99. Unanimous Security Council Vote, supra note 91.
100. Id.; H.R.C. Res. S-15/1, supra note 98, at 3.
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embargo, establishing a travel ban, and freezing all of Gadhafi's assets.' 0' On March 1,
2011, the U.N. General Assembly suspended the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya from the
Human Rights Council. 02
By mid-March 2011 the tensions between opposition militia and Gadhafi had only esca-
lated.10 3 As Gadhafi forces advanced towards Benghazi to quell the rapidly growing insur-
gency, the U.N. Security Council responded to deepening international humanitarian
concerns by passing the wide-reaching Resolution 1973: establishing a no-fly zone prima-
rily in response to reports that government aircraft were being used to target civilians,
authorizing international actors to take "all necessary measures to protect civilians," and
expanding the travel ban and asset freeze from Resolution 1970.104
For the international legal community, Resolution 1973 sparked serious debate over the
legality and legitimacy of U.N.-sanctioned regime changes within "the international sys-
tem of collective security.'' In the United States, President Obama's air-operations-
only and multi-lateral strategy struck a contrast with previous U.S. interventions through-
out the world.
1 6
Only days later, a coalition of Western powers began using air strikes to neutralize
Gadhafi's military posts, air bases, and ground forces. 107 To the relief of Libyan rebels and
concerned international parties, the effects in Benghazi and the rest of the country were
immediate, reversing Gadhafi's unhindered assaults upon opposition forces' 08
B. REGIMAE CHANGE
As the civil war dragged on in Libya's cities and deserts, international actors continued
to condemn Gadhafi and call for his resignation. 09 For the first time, the African Com-
mission on Human and Peoples' Rights deferred to calls for action from NGOs and insti-
tuted proceedings against Libya, alleging, among other violations, excessive use of force
against the civilian population and widespread unwarranted arrests of protesters and dissi-
dents."10 By mid-July, the International Criminal Court finished its preliminary investiga-
tions and issued warrants of arrest for crimes against humanity (murder and persecution)
against Colonel Gadhafi, his son Saif Al-Islam Gadhafi, and Abdullah Al-Senussi, a top
military official."'
101. S.C. Res. 1970, at 2-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
102. G.A. Res. 65/265, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/265 (Mar. 3, 2011).
103. See David Batty, Libya Uprising, GUARDIAN NEWS BLOG (Mar. 5, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/blog/201 1/mar/05/libya-protests-gaddafi-live-blog.
104. S.C. Res. 1973, at 3-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011); Eric Schmitt, U.S. Gives Its Air Power
Expansive Role in Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2011, at A13, http://www.nytirnes.com/2011/03/29/us/29mili-
tary.html.
105. See, e.g., Payandeh, supra note 92, at 355.
106. See Schmitt, supra note 104.
107. See Chris McGreal, War Rains Down on Libya, THE GuARD1AN, Mar. 21, 2011, at 1, available at 2011
WLNR 5477203; see also Schmitt, supra note 104.
108. See McGreal, supra note 107, at 1.
109. See, e.g., Mark Landler, Obama Says Qaddafi Must Leave Libya Now, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2011, at Al 1,
available at 2011 WLNR 4243400.
110. See The African Court on Human and People's Rights Seized of a Case against Libya, supra note 93.
111. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi & AI-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application
Pursuant to Article 58, T 41 Jun. 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1099314.pdf.
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On September 19, 2011, with the anti-Gadhafi forces nearly victorious and bearing
down on the coastal city of Sirte, Gadhafi's last stronghold, the U.N. Security Council
issued Resolution 2009 urging the Libyan National Transitional Council to uphold demo-
cratic principles and protect human rights, establishing a U.N. Support Mission in Libya
(UNSIL), and partially ending the asset freeze and arms embargo.' 2
On October 20, 2011, anti-Gadhafi forces defeated the last of the Gadhafi loyalists and
captured a badly injured Colonel Gadhafi, who shortly thereafter died from a close-range
gunshot to the head. 113 Three days later, the National Transitional Council issued a
"Declaration of Liberation."' 14 By October 27, the U.N. Security Council, concerned by
reports of continued reprisals against Gadhafi supporters, passed Resolution 2016 urging
Libyans to refrain from reprisals, urging the apprehension of all violators of international
human rights and humanitarian law, and ending the no-fly zone. n 5
C. A NEw (AND OLD) LIBYA
With the end of the revolution came the resurfacing of factional interests inherent in a
Libyan society diverse with religious conservatives, social democrats, secular liberals, the
Western-educated, and the rural-uneducated. 116 In a speech announcing the end of the
war, the National Transitional Council's chairman, Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, echoed calls for a
Libyan government based on Islamic tenets, promising the creation of Islamic banks and
intimating support for the growing and controversial movement in favor of legalized po-
lygamy.''7 Days later, Chairman Abdel-Jalil stepped down from power, signaling hope
for a Libyan democratic future. I18 Soon after, the National Transitional Council selected
Abdel Rahim el-Keeb, a Western-educated engineer and long-time exile, to serve as its
prime minister until national elections in June 2012.1 9
Libya faces serious challenges as it prepares for its coming elections and the realization
of a yet unwritten constitution. 120 Reluctant and insecure militias remain to be dis-
armed. 121 The need to address human rights violations and humanitarian issues still lin-
gers. 122 Of particular concern are reports of mass executions of Gadhafi loyalists,
allegations of widespread rape of women and girls by armed soldiers, and the uncertainty
112. S.C. Res. 2009, at 2-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2009 (Sept. 16, 2011).
113. Kareem Fahim, Anthony Shadid, & Rick Gladstone, Qaddafi, Seized by Foes, Meets a Violent End, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 21, 2011, at Al, available at 2011 WLNR 21610853.
114. S.C. Res. 2016, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2016 (Oct. 27, 2011).
115. Id. at 2-3; see Libya: Apparent Execution of 53 Gaddafi Supporters, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 24, 2011),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/24/libya-apparent-execution-5 3-gaddafi-supporters.
116. See Saskia van Genugten, Libya After Gadhafi, 53:3 SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POLrICS AND STRATEGY 61,
62 (2011).
117. See Adam Nossiter & Kareem Fahim, Revolution Won, Top Libyan Official Promises Elections and a More
Pious State, N.Y. TIMss, Oct. 24, 2011, at A10, available at 2011 WLNR 21784341.
118. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Libya Names an Engineer as Premier, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 1, 2011, at All,
available at 2011 WLNR 22466769.
119. Id.
120. See Libya: New Era Needs Focus on Rights, HUM. RTs. WATCH (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/
news/2011/10/20/libya-new-era-needs-focus-rights.
121. See Nossiter, supra note 117. As of mid-November, gun battles between uncertain, overzealous militias
still persisted. C. J. Chivers & Clifford Krauss, At Least Six Are Killed as Libyan Militias Clash on Coastal
Higbway Near Tripoli, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 2011, at A12, available at 2011 WLNR 23447341.
122. Libya: New Era Needs Focus on Rights, supra note 120.
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surrounding Gadhafi's execution-style death. 123 The foundations of Libyan law remain
uncertain, caught between Islamic conservatives, women's rights advocates, and Western-
educated seculars.124 Indeed, in the midst of reconciliation, compromise, and trust build-
ing, Libya must remake national institutions and civil society, all under the shadow of
imposing economic interests from abroad.125 Many fear that it is not democracy on the
horizon but more blood and tyranny. 126 Even in the best-case scenario, it will be years
before the Libyan people can resolve the injustices and rifts of the past in order to realize
the all-inclusive democracy for which many hope. 127
VIII. Morocco*
On July 1, 2011, more than seventy percent of eligible Moroccan voters went to the
polls to approve a new constitutional framework 128 designed to strengthen democratic
institutions and processes and to promote principles of "participation, pluralism and good
governance." 129 The July referendum included changes designed to empower the Prime
Minister and Parliament, 130 to extend political opportunities available to women,' 3' and to
make the Berber language (Tamazight) an official language alongside Arabic.' 32 The ref-
erendum also added a new section on civil liberties, including freedom of the press and
prohibitions against racism and torture, 33 as well as language emphasizing the presump-
tion of innocence and right to a speedy trial. 134
123. Ian Black, Gaddafi Loyalists Face Torture, Human Rights Groups Warn, THE GUARDIAN 7 (Oct. 21, 2011,
3:48 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/201 l/oct/2 1/gaddafi-loyalists-torture-human-rights; ICC Prose-
cutor May Bring Libya Rape Charges, REUTERs AFiucA (Nov. 9, 2011, 12:14 PM), http://afreuters.com/article/
topNews/idAFJOE7A80CK20111109; Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Panel Calls for Inquiry into Qaddafi's
Death, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/world/un-panel-calls-for-inquiry-
into-qaddafis-death.html?scp=6&sq=qaddafi%20death&st=cse.
124. See Genugten, supra note 116, at 62, 66-67.
125. Id. at 70; Phyllis Bennis, After Gadbafi, the West Eyes the Libyan Prize, SALON (Oct. 21, 2011, 2:00 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2011/10/20/after-gadhafi-the-west-eyes-the-libyan-prize/singleton/.
126. See, e.g., Benjamin Barber, Libya's Revolution has Triumphed, but Will Democracy?, THE GuRDIASN, (Oct.
21, 2011, 12:42 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/21/libya-revolution-democracy-
muammar-gaddafi.
127. See Margaret Coker, Libya Speeds Oil Output but Sees Hurdles Ahead, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11,2011), http:/
/online.wsj.com/article/SBl0001424052970204358004577029531381366726.html.
* Caidin Stapleton Kaprove, an associate with Greenberg Traurig LLP in Washington, DC and a former
law clerk at the International Court of Justice in the Hague, prepared this report on developments in
Morocco. Ms. Kaprove can be reached at kaprovec@gdaw.com.
128. Morocco Approves King Mohammed's Constitutional Reforms, BBC NEWS (uly 1, 2011, 8:34 PM), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa- 3976480.
129. MOROCCAN CONSTrrUTION, Preamble, available at http://www.justice.gov.ma/fr/egislation/legisla-
tion_.aspx?ty=l&id1=103 ("Fidhle i son choix irreversible de construire un Etat de droit d~mocratique, le
Royaume du Maroc poursuit r~solument le processus de consolidation et de renforcement des institutions
d'un Etat moderne, ayant pour fondements les principes de participation, de pluralisme et de bonne
gouvemance.") (for the Arabic, see http://www.goud.ma/attachment/281139/).
130. Id. tit. IV.
131. Id. tit. II, art. 19.
132. Id. tit. I, art. 5.
133. Id. tit. II, art. 19-40.
134. Id. art. 23; id. tit. VII, art. 120.
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At the same time, the new constitution reserves many important powers to the King.
The King retains the ability to appoint the prime minister (albeit from the majority party)
and members of his cabinet, 135 dissolve parliament,136 act as Supreme Chief of the Royal
Armed Forces,137 appoint Ambassadors 38 and preside over the High Judiciary Council.
39
The new constitution stresses the King's "inviolability"140 and his continued ability to
approve the nomination of judges141 and pronounce enacted laws. 142
The referendum responds to a series of demonstrations that took place over the first
nine months of 2011. Protesters involved in what has come to be known as the "February
20 Movement for Change" called on the government to reform the country's constitution,
create new jobs, reduce corruption, and guarantee the independence of the judiciary. 143
Since July 2011, the February-20 protestors and human rights organizations alike have
expressed dissatisfaction with the result.144 Some protestors continue to object to the pro-
cess of the referendum's creation, 145 noting that it was drafted by a commission of legal
experts and not by members of Parliament. 46 Others argue that the powers reserved to
the king are still too great, and that the new constitution's guarantees of an independent
judiciary are still too meager. 147 Still others dispute the legitimacy of the referendum
results, pointing to "incidents of voters being bussed to polling stations by local officials,
stations not carrying 'no' vote slips[,] and electoral officials not verifying identification or
requiring voter signatures." 48
135. Id. tit. I, art. 47, 48.
136. Id. art. 51.
137. Id. art. 53.
138. Id. art. 55.
139. Id. art. 56.
140. Id. art. 46.
141. Id. art. 57.
142. Id. art. 50.
143. Aida Alami, Morocco's Democratic Changes Fail to Appease All, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2011), http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/07/2 l/world/africa/2 liht-M2 1 -MOROCCO-REFERENDUM.htm?_r=1.
144. See Maria McFarland, Morocco May Not Be Changing Much, HuM. RTS. WATCH Jsuly 1, 2011), http://
www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/01/morocco-may-not-be-changing-much.
145. In June 2011, the February 20 Movement called for a nationwide boycott of the referendum. Protests
Called Against Morocco Reform Plan, ALJAzEERA (June 18, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
africa/2011/06/201161810543184895.html.
146. Simba Russeau, A 'Late Spring' Might Reach Morocco, ALJAZEERA (July 1, 2011, 12:22 PM), http://www.
aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/07/20117112327327383.html (according to Moroccan journalist Abdel-
lah Aoussar: "Despite the fact that the commission included highly respected personalities, professors, law
experts, sociologists and invited all the political parties, trade unions, components of civil society and human
right groups to offer suggestions, the February 20 movement along with three leftist groups, the banned
Islamic Justice and Charity Party and the Unified Socialist Party, decided to boycott the referendum on
grounds that the suggested draft is not made up by an elected commission, but rather by people nominated by
the king.").
147. One coordinator of the February 20 movement, Elabadila Chbihna, was quoted as saying: "We are not
at the vegetable market, negotiating prices. The king cannot propose an 80 percent democracy." Rolla
Scolari, Morocco's Referendum on Reform: Model for Arab Spring?, CHRISTtAN SCIENCE MONrTOR (July 1,
2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0701/Morocco-s-referendum-on-reform-
Model-for-Arab-Spring.
148. Paul Silverstein, Weighing Morocco's New Constitution, MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH & INFO. PROJECT (July
5, 2011), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero0705l1#_2-.
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Months after the fact, the full impact of the July 2011 constitutional referendum has yet
to be seen. Though many agree that the agreed-upon changes provided an "alternative to
the bloody confrontations that have marked the Arab Spring," 149 the effect of changes
designed to empower the Prime Minister and Parliament may not be completely clear
until after early parliamentary elections are held in late November 2011.150
IX. Pakistan*
A. BLAsPHEMY CONTROVERSY
Blasphemy laws, which protect Islamic authority and forbid any attack on Islam, have
been a controversial issue in Pakistan, attracting international attention and scrutiny.151
In January 2011, Punjab Governor Salman Taseer, a vocal opponent of the blasphemy
laws, was assassinated by his bodyguard Malik Mumtaz Qadri, presumably because Qadri
believed Taseer had threatened the blasphemy law. 152 Some Pakistanis believed the mur-
der was justified and that the blasphemy laws should not be threatened. 153 Qadri was
charged with murder and Judge Pervez Ali Shah of the Lahore High Court sentenced
Qadri to death by hanging.154 Many expected Qadri to get away with murder, but his
conviction was a notable exception. 15S The day the decision was delivered, protests en-
sued, and the Judge now faces death threats.'5 6 Since then the judge has left the coun-
try,15 7 and Qadri's death sentence was suspended in October, pending appeals. 15 8
149.'Nadim Audi, Offering Slow, Small Changes, Morocco's King Stays in Power, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2011, at
A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/1 l/world/africa/i1 morocco.html?pagewanted=all.
150. Maati Monjib, Will Morocco's Elections Subdue Popular Protests?, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L
PEACE: SADA (Nov. 22, 2011), http://camegieendowment.org/2011/11/22/will-morocco-s-elections-sub-
due-popular-protests/7ntj.
* Rina Shah is a Texas attorney currently serving as a Policy Analyst on National Healthcare Operations
for the Office of Personnel Management.
151. See Declan Walsh, Islamic Scholar Attacks Pakistan's Blasphemy Laws, THE GUARDIaN (Jan. 20, 2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/J*an/20/islam-ghamidi-pakistan-blasphemy-laws; see generally Tahir
Mahmood, Religion in Contemporary Legal Systems, 2011 BYU L. REv. 605 (2011); Paul Marshall, Exporting
Blasphemy Restrictions: The Organization of the Islamic Conference and the United Nations, 9 REv. OF FAITH &
INT'L AFFAIRS 57 (2011); Pakistan Urged to Act over Escalating Violence, AMNEsTY INT'L (July 7, 2011), http://
www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/pakistan-urged-act-over-escalating-violence-2011-07-07.
152. See Saba Imtiaz, Timeline: Pakistan Blasphemy law cases, Jan-uly 2011, THE EXs'ESS TRB UNE (Aug. 4,
2011), http://tribune.com.pk/story/223353/timeline-pakistan-blasphemy-law-cases-jan-july-201 1/.
153. See Declan Walsh, Pakistan's blasphemy laws are proving so divisive that even judges fear for their lives, THE
GsARtAR N (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2011/oct/03/pakistan-blas-
phemy-laws.
154. Id.
155. See Suzanna Kostor, Pakistan's travesty ofjustice, GLOBAL POST (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.globalpost.
com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/palistan/l 1 1005/pakistan-justice-terrorism-qadri-taseer-
blashphemy-law.
156. See Walsh, supra note 153.
157. Id.
158. See Shaan Khan, Pakistan Court Suspends Death Sentence of Governor's Kller, CNN (Oct. 11,2011), http:/
/articles.cnn.corn/201 1-10-1 l/asia/world-asia-pakistan-death-sentence-appeal.l _salman-taseer-pakistan-
court-mumtaz-.
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B. FRONTIER CRiMEs REGULATIONS
The Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), which came into effect under British Rule,
apply to Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and were enacted to protect govern-
mental control in these areas.' 59 The FCR stayed in effect, with some modifications, after
Pakistan gained its independence.160 The FCR have been criticized because they fail to
offer to the people of the FATA equal rights under the Pakistani Constitution and other
reforms. 161 For example, they do not have access to a regular court of law and an entire
community may be punished for the acts of an individual.' 62 Also, they are unable to
engage in party politics because the Political Parties Act does not apply in FATA.163
In November 2011, long-awaited reforms to the FCR were passed, which included the
following changes: 1) no indefinite detention; 2) the FCR tribunal has the same authority
as the High Court; 3) collective punishment will not apply to women, children under
sixteen, and adults over sixty-five; 4) no deprivation of property without compensation;
and 5) extension of the Political Parties Act to the FATA.164 Despite these reforms, many.
assert that there is still a long way to go to improve the rights of the people in the
FATA.165
X. Saudi Arabia*
The pace of legislative change in Saudi Arabia appears to have slowed in 2011 with
greater emphasis currently on social initiatives than on legislative modernization. The
long-awaited new Companies Law again failed to emerge from the complex Saudi law-
making process and the proposed new mortgage law has suffered a similar fate.
One policy announcement of major significance for foreign investors is the introduction
of the "Nitaqat" scheme for increasing the employment of Saudi nationals in the private
sector. Nitaqat is a reaction by the Saudi Government to continued high rates of unem-
ployment amongst Saudi citizens in a country where some 6.5 million expatriates work in
the private sector compared to 700,000 Saudi nationals.' 66 The Saudi Government also
159. See Abdullah Khoso, PAKISTAN: Frontier Crimes Regulation - Infringing Human and Child Rights, ASIAN





163. See Parties Called for Immediate Extension of Political Parties Act and Other Reforms in FATA, NAT'L D m.
INST. (Jun. 17, 2009), http://www.ndi.org/node/15612.
164. Said Nazir, Blog, Reforms in FATA will not help, THE EXPRESS TRIUNE (Nov. 13, 2011), http://
blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/8869/reforms-in-fata-will-not-help/.
165. Id.; ANP Demands More Amendments to FCR, DAWN (Nov. 14, 201 1), http://www.dawn.com/20 11/11/
15/anp-demands-more-amendments-to-fcr.html.
* Paul M. Fitzgerald and Lamia AI-Ogailee are attorneys with the Riyadh office of the Law Firm of
Mohammed AI-Ghamdi in association with Fulbright & Jaworski LLP.
166. Hany Kenawi, Nitaqat, the New Localization System for Jobs in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 15 LEx
ARABIAE 3 (Meyer-Rumann & Partners, Dubai) (July 2011), available at http://lexarabiae.meyer-reumann.
com/issues/2011-2/vol-xv---issue- 3 -july-201 1---articles/nitaqat-the-new-localization-system-for-jobs-in-
the-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia/.
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addresses this issue by a policy known as "Saudization," 167 which is found in the Labor
Law and requires that the percentage of Saudi nationals employed by an employer in
Saudi Arabia should not be less than seventy-five percent of the employer's total
workforce unless otherwise specified by the Minister of Labor. In practice, Ministerial
Resolutions have in fact reduced the required percentage for most fields of activity (e.g., a
general reduction to thirty percent 168 and a Council of Ministers 169 reduction to five per-
cent for all contractors that have entered into operation and maintenance contracts with
government entities in Saudi Arabia).
Nitaqat applies specific quotas to individual fields of activity or industries. Further, the
Ministry of Labor classifies entities into four categories: excellent, green, yellow, and red,
based on their current Saudization rates. 70 Entities within the excellent and green cate-
gories comprise those companies that have already met the relevant Saudization rate.
When fully implemented, these entities should enjoy certain benefits and can continue to
obtain and renew visas for expatriate workers. Yellow-rated entities have until February
2012 to meet their Saudization rates and face certain limitations, including not being able
to open new branches, being unable to transfer expatriate workers, and only being able to
obtain one new visa for each two existing visas that are cancelled. Red-rated entities have
until the end of November 2011 to meet their Saudization requirements; otherwise sanc-
tions will be imposed to prevent such companies from opening new branches, obtaining
visas for new expatriate workers, or renewing the visas of their existing expatriate workers
beyond a term of six years applied retrospectively.
The main implication for foreign investors and Saudi businesses is that a greater num-
ber of Saudi nationals will need to be hired, trained, and retained because a failure to
maintain the requisite Saudization rate has serious consequences. As a result, the costs for
private sector companies will increase as Saudi nationals command higher salaries than
many expatriates, particularly those from South and South East Asia, and training costs
will be greater. Most foreign investors recognize the need for the Saudi Government to
address Saudi unemployment. But there is widespread concern that Nitaqat will increase
costs in the private sector at a time of low economic growth.' 7'
167. Article 26(2) of the Labor Law, Royal Decree No. M/5 1, dated 23 Sha'aban 1426 corresponding to
Sept. 27, 2005.
168. Ministerial Resolution No. 3767/4, dated 28/02/1427 corresponding to March 29, 2006. The resolu-
tion also exempted employers with less than twenty employees from the Saudization requirement.
169. Council of Ministers Resolution No. 23, dated 17/1/1428 H corresponding to Feb. 5, 2007.
170. See generally, Employment Law, SAUDILEGAL, http://www.saudilegal.com/saudilaw/17-law.html (last
visited Mar. 9, 2012).
171. Studies suggest that the non-oil GDP growth in 2011 is lower than the private sector salary increases
for the same period. See Undermining Nitaqat, ZAWYA (Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.zawya.com/story.cfim/
sidZAWYA20111009062718/Undermining.-Nitaqat.
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XI. Syria*
A. LIFTING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY
In March of 2011, the fervor of the Arab Spring's unrest reached Syria.172 Armed Syr-
ian security forces, however, began a fierce and immediate crackdown using live ammuni-
tion against protesters in an effort to crush this uprising before it spreads. 173 Faced with
unprecedented challenge to its authority, the Syrian Government announced it would im-
plement swift legal reforms in response to public demands.' 74
On April 21, 2011, the Syrian President issued Decree No. 161 lifting the State of
Emergency Law No. 2, which was issued in 1963 by the National Revolutionary Coun-
cil.175 The President also issued Legislative Decree No. 53, abolishing the Supreme State
Security Court, 1 7 6 and Legislative Decree No. 54, regulating the citizens' rights to peace-
ful demonstration. 77
Article 2 of Law No. 54 recited the right of people to peacefully demonstrate as a basic
human right, which is also guaranteed by the Syrian Constitution.17 8 The law requires the
Ministry of Interior to form a specialized committee that would accept applications from
organizers for demonstration, and issue licenses following a review of such requests. 179
The Law further requires that organizers of demonstrations form a demonstration com-
mittee and provide such information as date, time, place of the demonstration, and its
purpose. 80 The demonstration committee must also pledge in writing that it will be re-
sponsible for all damages to public or private properties resulting from the demonstra-
tion.' 8' Despite the government concessions, demonstrations continued relentlessly. 82
B. POLITCAL PARTms LAW
The President issued Legislative Decree No. 100, Political Parties Law, on August 4,
2011, in an attempt to allow the establishment of political parties and to end the Baath
Party's political monopoly over the country. 8 3 The law requires political parties to be
Joseph F. Jacob, an attorney in Albany, New York, prepared the report on Syria.
172. See In Syria, Demonstrations Are Few and Brief, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.con/
2011 /03/ 17 / world/middleeast/17syria.htm.
173. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Protests Spread Against Assad Rule in Syria, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2011), http://
uk.reuters.com/article/2011/03/25/us-syria-idUKTRE72N2MC20110325.
174. Joshua Landis, As Protests Mount, Is .There a Soft Landing for Syria?, TIME WORLD (Mar. 25, 2011),
http:// www. time.com/ime/world/article/0,8599,2061364,00.html.
175. See Decrees on Ending State of Emergency, Abolishing SSSC, Regulating Right to Peaceful Demonstration,
SYIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCY, http://www.sana.sy/ara/360/2011/04/22/342709.htm (Arabic); http://www.
sana.sy/ eng /361/2011/04/22/342711 .htn (English).
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id. Legislative Decree No. 54, art. 2(a).
179. See id. art. 4.
180. See id. art. 5.
181. Id.
182. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Liing Syria's emergency law "useless" - Maleb, REUTERS (Apr. 21, 2011, 3:32
PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/04/21/uk-syria-emergency-maleh-idUKTRE73K3QY20110421.
183. See R. Milhem & al-Ibrahim, President al-Assad Issues Legislative Decree on Parties law, SYRIAN ARAB
NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.sana.sy/eng/361/2011/08/04/362192.htm; President al-Assad issued
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committed to the Syrian Constitution, principles of democracy, and the rule of law.184 It
further prohibits parties from discriminating against members based on ethnicity, gender,
or race and from being based on religious, tribal, or regional affiliations.185 Subsequent
articles of the new law regulated the process by which at least fifty founding members
must sign the application forming the party and meet certain basic age, citizenship, and
non-conviction of a crime conditions.18 6 Specific terms for funding and accounting of the
party are also detailed as well as government sponsorships and contributions. 8 7 Activists
and protestors immediately dismissed the law and considered the government reform as a
way of easing mounting pressure and criticism of its human rights violations and the use of
force against civilians.' 88
C. NEw MEDIA LAw
On August 28, 2011, the Syrian President issued a new Media Law No. 108,189 pre-
mised on the preamble that the media is free, independent, and not restricted except as
required by the Constitution and the country's laws.190 Article 3 of the new Media Law
states that the profession of media is based on freedom of expression, constitutional rights,
and international human rights declarations.' 91 It also recognizes the citizens' right to be
informed about the government and public affairs.192 Article 4 recites basic principles that
the media should take into consideration when exercising freedom of expression, such as
practicing "responsibly and conscientiously" while also respecting the "Press Code of
Honor."1 93 Despite the new law, scores of journalists are reportedly arrested or missing,
suggesting that the Regime's reform is only an attempt to divert attention from its repres-
sive tactics.194
Legislative Decree No. 100 for 2011 on the law of parties, Syrian Arab News Agency (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.
sana.sy/print.html?sid=362169&newlang=ara [hereinafter Legislative Decree No. 100] (translated to English us-
ing Google Translate).
184. See Legislative Decree No. 100, supra note 183, art. 5(A).
185. See id. art. 5(D).
186. See id. art. 8.
187. See id. ch. mII.
188. Jim Muir, Syria Violence: Assad's multi-party decree dismissed, BBC NEWS (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.
bbc.co.uklnews/world-middle-east-14405293; Syria dissidents: new parties law a political ploy, MIDDLE EAST
ONINE (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=47497.
189. See F. Allafi et al., President al-Assad Issues Legislative Decree on Media Law, SYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCY
(Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.sana.sy/eng/361/2011/08/29/366490.htm; President al-Assad issued Decree 108 on
the law of the media, SYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.sana.sy/print.
html?sid=366489&newlang_=ara [hereinafter Legislative Decree No. 108] (translated to English using Google
Translate).
190. See Legislative Decree No. 108, supra note 189, art. 2.
191. See id. art. 3.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Dahlia El Zein, The 'New' Syrian Media Law is Nothing New, COMMIrrTEE TO PROTECT JOURNAL-
ISTS BLOG (Sept. 7, 2011, 12:46 PM), http://www.cpj.org/blog/2011/09/the-new-syrian-media-law-is-noth-
ing-new.php; Syrian Journalist Arrested, Held Without Charge, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Sept.
6, 2011, 6:03 PM), http://cpj.org/20ll/09/syrian-journalist-arrested-held-without-charge.php; Syrian Jour-
nalists, Blogger Missing, CoMMrr'EE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Oct. 31, 2011, 5:19 PM), http://www.cpj.
org/201 1/10/syrian-journaists-blogger-missing.php.
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XiI. Turkey*
Turkey passed sweeping constitutional reforms to modernize the nation's human and
civil rights protections. Unfortunately, Turkey still suffers from free speech restrictions,
particularly in the area of cyber speech. In 2007, Turkey passed Law No. 5651 that allows
Turkish courts to block websites with objectionable content, including websites that insult
the memory of Atatuirk, the nation's founder.195 In May 2008, Turkey's telecommunica-
tions authority blocked YouTube and all YouTube-related websites because of a video that
depicted Atatiirk and Turks as homosexuals. 196
On October 30, 2010, the ban was lifted by a court in Ankara because, as the Turkish
Transport Minister put it, "common sense prevailed." 97 But the ban was reinstated just a
few days later.'98 Turkey has banned somewhere between 5,000 and 6,000 websites for
various reasons, including "for criticizing Ataturk or the army, for perceived attacks on the
nation's 'dignity' or for referring to Turkey's Kurdish and Armenian minorities." 199 Tur-
key's web-monitoring policy has been widely criticized by a number of human rights and
free speech organizations, as well as Turks, and is seen as a step backwards in terms of
gaining membership into the European Union.2 00
Although Turkey may be lagging in the area of free speech, the country seems to be
developing a more progressive business legal framework. In February 2011, the Turkish
legislature enacted the country's new Commercial Code.201 The new code puts into effect
several modern business regulations, including the "generally accepted financial reporting
and auditing principles" 202 in line with the International Financial Reporting Standards, as
well as strict corporate transparency regulations.2 03 The transparency regulations, for ex-
ample, require companies to disclose a wide range of information on their websites. 20 4
The new law will also ensure strong corporate governance principles for companies in
Turkey, borrowing heavily from U.S. jurisprudence. 205 In addition, the law's new auditing
* Kinan H. Romman, an associate with Ahmad, Zavitsanos & Anaipakos PC in Houston, Texas, prepared
the report on developments in Turkey. For developments during 2010, see Anita Ferasat et al., Middle East
and North Africa, 45 INT'L LAW. 561 (2011).
195. Allon Bar, Turkey Erplares the Internet, Along with Restrictions, NEW MEIA & DEV. COMM., http://
www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/nelson/newmediadevO8/Freedom%20of%2Othe%20intemet%20in%20Turkey.
html (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
196. Turkey Lifts Two-yearBan on YouTube, BBC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technol-
ogy-11659816.
197. Id.
198. Ece Toksabay, Turkey Reinstates YouTube Ban, REUTERS (Nov. 3, 2010, 12:25 PM), http://www.reuters.
comi/article/2010/11/03/us-turkey-youtube-idUSTRE6A227C20101103.
199. Id.; see also Turkey Lifts YouTube Ban After More Than 2 Years, Huffington Post (Oct. 30, 2010, 4:37 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/3 1/turkey-youtube-ban-lifted_n_776618.html.
200. See, e.g., Dr. Yaman Akdeniz, Report of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of The Media on Turkey and
Internet Censorship, ORG. FOR SECURITY & CO-OPERATION IN EUR. (2009), www.osce.org/fom/41091.
201. Turkey Welcomes New Commercial Code, ERNST & YOUNG T MAGAZINE (Mar. 23, 2011), http://tma-
gazine.ey.con/turkey-welcomes-new-commercial-code/.
202. Id.
203. Eee Giner, Managing Partner, Gfiner Law Office, A Brief Overview of the Effects of the New Turkish
Commercial Code on Acquisitions and PE Investments in Turkish Companies, Presentation at Euromoney
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regulations, it is reported, are "very similar to Sarbanes-Oxley."2 06 The code even ensures
protection for minority shareholders of Turkish corporations. It appears that large inter-
national accounting firms are gearing up to advise clients doing business in Turkey on how
to comply with the country's new code.
XLII. United Arab Emirates*
A. CORPORATE (FEDERAL)
UAE Cabinet Resolution No. 3 of 2011 concerning the Commercial Agencies Commit-
tee (the Committee) gave the Committee responsibility for settling commercial agency
disputes, including disputes concerning agency de-registration. 207 The Committee may
defer disputes to UAE courts, and the parties may challenge in court the Committee's
decisions.
According to Ministerial Resolution No. 377 of 2010,208 wholly foreign-owned branch
offices may not engage in general trading activities, i.e., buying or importing for resale in
the UAE. This should not affect trading licenses previously granted. This resolution also
confirms that free zone entities are allowed to register branch offices in the UAE proper.
Under Ministerial Resolution No. 208 of 2011, a foreign company must deposit a guar-
antee in the sum of Dhs. 50,000 with the Ministry of Economy for each branch office to
be opened in UAE.209 Previously, such foreign companies were required to submit a bank
guarantee for this amount from a bank operating in the UAE.
B. LABOR (FEDERAL)
The Ministry of Labor (the MOL) introduced five new types of work permits under
Cabinet Resolution No. 25 of 2010.210 These include part-time work permits, juvenile
work permits for employees between the ages of fifteen and eighteen, and temporary work
permits for employees engaged in a project for less than six months. Cabinet Resolution
No. 26 of 2010211 provides for UAE employers to be classified into one of three categories
in accordance with certain standards and requirements of the MOL, including Emiratiza-
tion. A benefit of a UAE employer being qualified in the highest category, i.e., Class One,
is the exemption from the normal bank guarantee requirement for end of service benefits
206. Id.
* Vandana Rupani, Hassan Elsayed, Mark E. Bisch, and John C. Boehm, Jr. are attorneys in the Dubai
office of Fulbright & Jaworski LLP.
207. Cabinet Resolution No. 3 of 2011 concerning the Commercial Agencies Committee, UAE Official
Gazette No. 519 (Mar. 15, 2011).
208. Ministerial Resolution No. 377 of 2010 on approving the guide to the licensing procedures for
branches and offices of establishments incorporated abroad and in the Free Zones, UAE Official Gazette No.
514 (Oct. 31, 2010).
209. Ministerial Resolution No. 208 of 2011 concerning the bank guarantee applicable to the branches and
offices of foreign firms incorporated abroad and in the UAE free zones.
210. Cabinet Resolution No. 25 of 2010 concerning internal work permits applicable in the Ministry of
Labor, UAE Official Gazette No. 511 (Aug. 31, 2010).
211. Cabinet Resolution No. 26 of 2010 on regulating the classification of firms governed by the UAE
Labor Law and the bank guarantees applicable thereto, UAE Official Gazette No. 511 (Aug. 31, 2010).
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for its employees. It is too early to know how these changes will be implemented in
practice.
C. CotpoRATE (DUBA)
Dubai Law No. 13 of 2011 regulating economic activities in Dubai, 212 like Federal
Ministerial Resolution No. 377 discussed above, contemplates the possibility of free zone
entities establishing branch offices outside the free zone, in Dubai proper in this case.
This law also provides that free-zone entities may be authorized to practice their licensed
activities in Dubai proper, under certain terms and conditions to be issued by the Execu-
tive Council. We do not know yet what those conditions are, so we do not know how
significantly this will expand the ability of free-zone businesses to operate outside the free
zone in Dubai proper.
D. LITIGATION (DuBAI)
Pursuant to Law No. 16 of 2011 on amending some provisions of Law No. 12 of 2004
concerning the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts,2 13 parties to a con-
tract now may opt-in to the DIFC Courts' jurisdiction even if neither party nor the con-
tract has any connection with the DIFC. This law expands the choice of forums for
dispute resolution in Dubai. The DIFC Courts are English language civil and commercial
courts that follow common law, rather than civil law, procedures. The extent to which the
DIFC Courts' extended jurisdiction will be recognized outside Dubai remains to be seen.
212. Law No. 13 of 2011 on regulating economic activities in the Emirate of Dubai, Dubai Official Gazette
No. 356 (Sept. 29, 2011).
213. Law No. 16 of 2011 on amending some provisions of Law No. 12 of 2004 concerning the Dubai
International Financial Centre Courts, issued on October 31, 2011.
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